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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Eugene Ray Cobell appeals from the district court's order summarily dismissing 
his successive petition for post-conviction relief. The district court dismissed the petition 
on the ground that Mr. Cobell's claim of ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction 
counsel was not a proper basis upon which to file a successive petition for post-
conviction relief. The district court erred. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Cobell's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
1 
ISSUE 




The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing Mr. Cobell's Successive Petition For 
Post-Conviction Relief 
A. Introduction 
In this case, the district court identified a sole basis for the summary dismissal of 
Mr. Cobell's successive petition for post-conviction relief: that a claim of ineffective 
assistance of prior post-conviction counsel was not a proper basis upon which to file a 
successive petition. Because both the Idaho Supreme Court and Court of Appeals have 
held to the contrary, the district court erred. This Reply Brief addresses the State's 
response that Mr. Cobell's petition was untimely and an improper successive petition. 
B. The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing Mr. Cobell's Successive 
Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
1. Timeliness 
The State asserts that, because Mr. Cobell's successive petition was filed more 
than one year after the issuance of the remittitur in his direct appeal, it was not a timely 
petition. The State's argument is flawed for two reasons. 
First, the district court did not provide notice that it intended to dismiss on this 
ground, and thus, Mr. Cobell was not afforded an opportunity to demonstrate whether 
this petition was timely. The district court articulated a sole basis for dismissing the 
petition - that a claim of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel was not a 
"sufficient reason" for a petitioner to be able to raise or re-raise claims through 
successive petitions. (R., pp.27-28.) As set forth in the Appellant's Brief, the district 
court was incorrect. Thus, Mr. Cobell was not on notice that he needed to address 
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timeliness in order to survive summary dismissal. And as the State notes, the time 
period for filing a petition for post-conviction relief can be expanded if the petitioner can 
make a showing that the limitation period should be tolled. (Respondent's Brief, p.8 
(citing Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247 (2009)). Mr. Cobell was never afforded the 
opportunity to address the timeliness of his successive petition, and thus this Court 
cannot affirm the district court on this alternate basis. 
Second, the deadline for the filing of Mr. Cobell's successive petition was not one 
year from the date of the remittitur in his direct appeal. Rather, and as noted by the 
State, this Court applies a "reasonable time" standard to determine the timeliness of a 
successive petition. (Respondent's Brief, pp.7-8. (citing Charboneau v. State, 144 
Idaho 900, 904 (2007)). The State asserts that, "Cobell does not argue that his claims 
were not know to him or could reasonable have been known to him in the requisite time-
frame for filing his initial post-conviction petition." (Respondent's Brief, p.8.) However, 
this overlooks the fact that Mr. Cobell asserted that his post-conviction counsel were 
ineffective; by definition, this claim could not have been raised in the initial post-
conviction proceeded; it must be address in a successive petition. And the State has 
not asserted that Mr. Cobell's successive petition was not filed within a "reasonable 
time" of the dismissal of his first petition. Thus, the State's argument regarding 
timeliness fails. 
2. Successive Petition 
The State argues generally that Mr. Cobell's claim was insufficient to withstand 
summary dismissal, but never actually defends the district court's sole reason for 
4 
dismissal. (Respondent's Brief, p.9-12.) Rather, the State miscasts Mr. Cobell's claim 
into a different one. The State asserts: 
Cobell does not assert on appeal that he had insufficient notice that his 
successive petition for post-conviction relief would be summarily 
dismissed for failure to show a sufficient reason his claims were not raised 
in his initial petition, instead he argues he is entitled to relief because the 
district court misstated the law. (Appellant's brief, pp.8-10.) Cobell's 
position appears to be all that is required to avoid summary dismissal of a 
successive petition for post-conviction relief is the mere statement that 
post-conviction counsel was ineffective. (See Appellant's brief, pp.8-9.) 
(Respondent's Brief, p.10.) The State is correct that Mr. Cobell did not assert that he 
received insufficient notice of the reason that his petition would be dismissed. However, 
Mr. Cobell was not on notice that his petition would be "summarily dismissed for failure 
to show a sufficient reason his claims were not raised in his petition," as the State 
asserts. The district court clearly gave notice for the reason it was dismissing the 
petition - that Follinus v. State, 127 Idaho 897 (Ct. App. 1995), provided that, "there is 
no right to post-conviction counsel, [and] a petition based on ineffectiveness of post-
conviction counsel is without merit." (R., pp.27-28.) The district court could not have 
been clearer:, "the petitioner's sole argument that his claims were not adequately 
raised in his initial post conviction petition is that his post-conviction counsel was 
ineffective." 
The State then miscasts Mr. Cobell's argument as, "Cobell's position appears to 
be all that is required to avoid summary dismissal of a successive petition for post-
conviction relief is the mere statement that post-conviction counsel was ineffective." 
(Respondent's Brief, p.10.) This is not Mr. Cobell's position. Rather, Mr. Cobell's 
position is that the sole basis for the dismissal in this case was error. Mr. Cobell 
appealed the only adverse ruling that the district court made - that Fol/inus precluded 
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the filing of a successive petition. Again, the State makes no argument that this is a 
correct statement of the law. Rather, the State asks this Court to envision a scenario 
where the district court actually gave a correct reason to dismiss the petition and then 
argue that, because Mr. Cobell did not assert that that reason was error, his petition 
was summarily dismissed. What the State is really asking this Court to do is affirm on 
an alternative theory upon which the district court did not give notice. 
Mr. Cobell did not have notice, as the State asserts, that his petition would be 
dismissed generally for failure to show why his claims were not addressed in the initial 
petition. The district court noted that Mr. Cobell's sole reason for bringing the petition 
was a claim of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel and that his claim failed 
as a matter of law pursuant to Follinus. This was error. The district court did not put 
Mr. Cobell on notice that his assertion was inadequate to survive summarily dismissal -
it held that the allegation itself could never justify such a petition. Because the district 
court did not put Mr. Cobell on notice that he did not sufficiently allege a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, affirming on this basis would be error because the 
court never gave Mr. Cobell an opportunity to rebut such a claim. The order summarily 
dismissing the petition must therefore be reversed. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Cobell requests that the district court's order summarily dismissing his 
petition for post-conviction relief be reversed and his case remanded for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this 2nd day of October, 2012. 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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